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An Essay Concerning Some Problems
with the Constitutional-Doubt Canon
Benjamin M. Flowers*
Abstract
The constitutional-doubt canon instructs that statutes should
be interpreted in a way that avoids placing their constitutionality
in doubt. This canon is often said to rest on the presumption that
Congress does not intend to exceed its constitutional
authority. That presumption, however, is inconsistent with the
notion that government actors tend to exceed their lawful
authority—a notion that motivates our constitutional structure,
and in particular the series of checks and balances that the
Constitution creates. This tension between the constitutionaldoubt canon and the Constitution’s structure would be acceptable
if the canon accurately reflected the manner in which the public
understands legislative enactments. But it doesn’t. Thus, the only
possible justification for the constitutional-doubt canon is stare
decisis.
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I. Introduction
Our Constitution is built on a profound distrust of
government. Members of the founding generation understood
1
that government officials are mortals, not angels. And they
understood that all mortals, even well-meaning ones, will tend to
aggrandize their power, exercising authority they do not have. So
the founding generation wrote and ratified a constitution that
harnessed that temptation: It established three co-equal
branches, divided sovereignty between the state and federal
governments, and empowered each to check overreach by the
others.2 Thus, the natural tendency of government officials to
vigorously enforce and protect their own authority would cause
them to resist encroachment (that is, overreach) by those in other
branches and levels of government.3
The constitutional-doubt canon is in tension with this design.
That interpretive rule instructs that “[a] statute should be
interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in
doubt.”4 In other words, the canon presumes that Congress did
not exceed its constitutional authority. This presumption
contradicts the skepticism toward government actors that our
1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 349 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary
to controul the abuses of government . . . . If men were angels, no government
would be necessary.”).
2. See id. (“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”); id. (describing the “constant
aim” of our constitution “to divide and arrange the several offices in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of
every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights”); see also U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that
our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other.”).
3. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that “the parchment delineation of the boundaries”
between the branches of government would be ineffective without our system of
checks and balances) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 at 494 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
4. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW § 38, at 247 (2012).
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Constitution embodies. That would be tolerable if the canon
reflected the way that statutes were naturally understood. But it
does not, and so the only justification for the canon’s existence is
stare decisis. Or so I will argue.
II. The Constitutional-Doubt Canon and Expected Meaning
The constitutional-doubt canon is sometimes described as
resting on the “presumption that Congress did not intend” to
enact a statute that “raises serious constitutional doubts.”5 Thus,
the thinking goes, when a statute is susceptible of multiple
interpretations, courts ought to choose the constitutionally
permissible one.
The justification fails at the outset, because it is based on the
false notion that courts ought to give statutes the meaning that
Congress intended rather than the one it enacted. This notion is
false because we are governed by the laws that Congress passes,
not the ones it wanted to pass.6 And even if Congressional intent
mattered, it is often (always?) doubtful that Congress had any
7
one intention.
Properly interpreting a statute means giving the statute
whatever meaning it had at the time of its enactment.8 Canons of
interpretation, to the extent they are valid, assist this task; they
provide heuristics that judges can use for determining the
manner in which the public would have understood the
legislation at the time of its enactment. An interpretive cannon’s
validity thus turns on how reliably it points courts to the original
public meanings of the statutes they interpret. And on that score,
5. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 523 (2012) (finding that
statute meant what it said, notwithstanding evidence that the chief legislative
sponsor intended to enact the opposite of what the plain meaning required).
7. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”:
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
8. See Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785, 788 (2015) (recognizing
that statutes retain the meaning they had at the time of their enactment);
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, § 7, at 78–92 (explaining the “fixed-meaning
canon,” according to which statutes “must be given the meaning they had when”
they were “adopted”).
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the constitutional-doubt canon fails miserably. I am aware of no
evidence that presumptions regarding constitutionality are
somehow baked into public perceptions regarding statutory
meaning. Again, the founding generation recognized that
legislatures (indeed, all governments and government actors)
would tend to exceed their authority. Nothing in the time since
has happened to prove them wrong. The suggestion that the
constitutional-doubt canon reflects public understanding is
therefore difficult to take seriously—which is perhaps why, so far
as I can tell, no one has ever tried to mount this defense.
One might object that canons of interpretation do more than
9
function “as empirical heuristics for interpreting new texts.” At
least some substantive canons are “distinct rules of unwritten
law, which act of their own force in future cases unless abrogated
10
or impliedly repealed.” So it is with the constitutional-doubt
canon, the argument goes.
This is surely an accurate description of the way in which
substantive canons work in practice. But it seems to me there are
only two justifications for such rules. First, the substantive
background rules may be so well established that they accurately
reflect the manner in which the public understands statutory
text. That justification cannot work here, since there is no basis
for inferring that the constitutional-doubt canon accurately
captures public understanding. And at the time of the
Constitution’s ratification, the constitutional-doubt canon could
not possibly have been so well-established a rule, since AngloAmerican jurisprudence had not previously required assessing
the constitutionality of statutes against a written constitution.
The second justification is stare decisis. That justification is quite
powerful, as I’ll discuss later, but its force has nothing to do with
the canon’s interpretive accuracy.
The foregoing assumes that legislative intent is irrelevant to
the interpretive task. But even if we assume that intent does
matter, does the canon fare any better? That is, is there any

9. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1105 (2017).
10. Id. at 1106.
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reason to suppose that Congress does generally intend not to pass
unconstitutional laws?
No. The framers rightly realized that government actors will
tend to exceed their lawful authority, not hew to it. Two-hundredplus years of experience with state and federal legislatures
11
12
13
exceeding their authority again and again (and again and
again14) confirms the founding generation’s wisdom. This is no
slight to legislators, the vast majority of whom are no doubt
motivated by a good-faith belief that the legislation they propose
will improve public welfare. But that is precisely the problem:
Legislators—indeed, all elected officials—obtain and keep their
jobs by promising to deliver results for their constituents. If the
Constitution stands in the way of delivering those results, one
would expect them to violate the Constitution. Moreover, as
discussed below, the form of judicial restraint on which the canon
arguably rests may have the effect of exacerbating this tendency
in legislators and executive officers.
The upshot of this is that this canon cannot be justified by
Congressional intent: Assuming there is any such thing, it is
doubtful that legislators can fairly be presumed to intend to act
constitutionally.
III. The Constitutional-Doubt Canon and Constitutional Structure
The more plausible justifications for the constitutional-doubt
canon are not interpretive justifications at all. Rather, most who
are candid will admit that it “represents judicial policy—a
11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (holding section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional).
12. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 432 (1870) (holding that a
Maryland law, which “impose[d] a discriminating tax upon all persons trading
in” a particular manner “who are not permanent residents in the State,”
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
13. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (holding that state
laws segregating students on the basis of race violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
14. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 504 (2010) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority when it imposed
“dual for-cause limitations” on the President’s removal power).
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judgment that statutes ought not to tread on questionable
constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly.”15 Let’s suppose
that “judicial policy” has any place in statutory interpretation.
Does judicial policy support the canon?
Still no. Start with the notion that “statutes ought not to
tread on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so
clearly.”16 Why would that be? Our Constitution gives to each
branch a set of limited powers. But each branch is free to exercise
those powers to their limits. To use a driving analogy,
government actors receive either a green light or a red light;
there is no yellow light that requires them to use caution as they
approach the limits of their powers. And to pretend there is to
permit the judiciary to overstep its powers in the guise of judicial
restraint; to limit the authority of the other branches (and the
states) based on a “judicial policy” with no place in the
Constitution’s text.17
Some have also suggested that the canon is justified by a
different policy: “courts should minimize the occasions on which
they confront and perhaps contradict the legislative branch.”18
This rationale cannot be reconciled with our constitutional
structure. Once again, our Constitution is designed to pit the
branches against one another. They are supposed to forthrightly
confront and contradict one another. (Again, the constitutionaldoubt canon sometimes causes courts to contradict Congress by
15. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, § 38, at 249.
16. Id.
17. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983)
The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising
constitutional questions is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach
of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant
modern interpretation of the Constitution—to create a judge-made
constitutional “penumbra” that has much the same prohibitory effect
as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself.
See also United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (“The canon about avoiding constitutional decisions, in particular, must be
used with care, for it is a closer cousin to invalidation than to interpretation. It
is a way to enforce the constitutional penumbra, and therefore an aspect of
constitutional law proper.”).
18. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 249.
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giving its statutes an unfair reading.19 But thwarting other
branches in the legitimate exercise of their authority, and doing
so while pretending to exercise restraint, is neither forthright nor
a permissible exercise of the constitutional check.) When their
willingness to do so wanes, the likelihood that constitutional
actors will exceed their constitutional authority waxes. So,
perhaps it is no surprise that, in the decades after the
constitutional-doubt
canon
received
its
most
famous
20
endorsement,
the Court repeatedly deferred to Congress’s
exercise of legislative authority; thus permitting the exercise of
legislative power unimaginable for the first hundred and fifty
years of American history. This is not to say that the
constitutional-doubt canon necessarily (or even usually) means
deferring to Congress; once again, it often means unlawfully
trimming Congress’s work. What I mean to say is that the
constitutional-doubt canon, insofar as it springs from the notion
that the branches ought to avoid conflict, springs from the same
misguided concept of “judicial restraint” that resulted in a vast
expansion of federal authority.
Judges should not needlessly seek out conflict. Judicial
usurpation is no better than judicial abnegation. My point is
simply that courts ought not actively avoid confrontation:
Legislation should be given a fair reading, and should be held
unconstitutional when (and only when) it is.
IV. The Constitutional-Doubt Canon and Stare Decisis

19. See supra note 17; Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2109, 2112 (2015) (criticizing the canon on the ground that it “leads to tortured
constructions of statutes that bear little resemblance to laws actually passed by
the elected branches”).
20. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))).
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The
foregoing
establishes,
at
most,
that
the
constitutional-doubt canon should never have been adopted. But
it does not follow that courts ought to abandon it now. The reason
is stare decisis. Courts began using the constitutional-doubt
canon no later than the 1800s.21 Since the 1940s, at least, it has
been a staple of judicial opinions. Congress and state legislatures
have thus legislated in the shadow of this canon. As a result, it is
quite likely that at least some laws have been passed in reliance
on the canon’s existence. That is, legislatures may have passed
constitutionally dubious laws because their members knew or
believed that the courts would bail them out if push came to
shove.
What to do about this? That goes far beyond the scope of this
paper. Whether and when to defer to precedent has left people
22
much smarter than I am with little to offer. For my purposes, it
suffices to say that stare decisis is an important consideration—
one that even originalists ought to take seriously23—and that it
may well end up requiring courts to go on applying the
constitutional-doubt canon. But if stare decisis is not a good
defense, then the canon is indefensible.

21. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71,
73 n.9 (1995) (tracing the canon’s history).
22. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial
Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 433 (1988)
I have brought you a few contentions: that the role of precedent
should be similar for all decisions interpreting texts, with any
difference in the direction of making it harder to revise constitutional
interpretation, and that precedent can be a destabilizing as well as a
stabilizing influence. Beyond those affronts to accepted wisdom I
have little to say. I began without a theory of stare decisis and end
that way.
23. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling
Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009).

